Methodological Demonstration

From the CRA source to the human decision

A fictitious case illustrating the complete chain: official text → sub-obligation → applicability → evidence → coverage → human decision — including a rejected proposal.

Overview

The traceability chain for this case

Every link is documented, attributed, and examinable. The rejected proposal remains visible.

  1. Official source
  2. Sub-obligation
  3. Applicability decision
  4. Evidence and validation
  5. Coverage
  6. Human decision
  7. Rejected proposal
01 — Official Source

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 — Cyber Resilience Act

Regulation
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024
Reference
Art. 13(1) — Manufacturer obligations: security by design
Official references

Methodological paraphrase — English rendering of the French text of Art. 13(1), not the official English wording

When placing a product with digital elements on the market, manufacturers ensure that the product has been designed, developed and manufactured in accordance with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I, Part I.

— Art. 13(1), Regulation (EU) 2024/2847

Internal ID SRC-001

Provenance note
Demonstration internal identifier — in a real deployment, this field would carry the SHA-256 fingerprint of the official PDF file consulted. No real document fingerprint is exposed in this demonstration.

This demonstration aims for alignment with ELI; it does not claim systematic ELI implementation.

02 — Working Sub-Obligation

SO-001: Integration of cybersecurity requirements into the development lifecycle

Identifier
SO-001
Source link
Art. 13(1) + Annex I, Part I

Working interpretation

For a fictitious embedded software product hypothetically within CRA scope, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the essential cybersecurity requirements (Annex I, Part I) have been integrated into its development process — secure-by-design, vulnerability management, security testing.

Status Working draft — validation in progress

Mapping note
Working mappings with documented rationale; their individual validation remains to be established.

This formulation is a methodological interpretation for demonstration purposes. It does not constitute an automatic legal equivalence or expert legal advice.

03 — Applicability Decision

Does this sub-obligation apply to the fictitious product?

Does the fictitious product "NEXO-FW v2.1" (embedded firmware for industrial IoT device) fall within the scope of CRA Art. 13(1)?

Applicable — under the hypothesis of inclusion within CRA scope

NEXO-FW v2.1 is an embedded software made available on the Union market, integrated into a device with digital elements. Under the fictitious assumption that this product falls within CRA scope, Art. 13(1) applies without identified exception.

Identifier
AD-001
Assigned to
Product Compliance Manager (fictitious)
Date
Decision status
Decision attributed, dated, and recorded — declarative
Decision limits
This decision rests on an assumed inclusion within CRA scope, not verified by a legal expert in this fictitious scenario.

The decision is presented as attributed and dated. It is not equivalent to an electronic signature or an automated legal decision.

04 — Evidence and Evidence Validation

Fictitious Evidence Examined

Each piece of evidence is evaluated for its own admissibility, distinctly from its contribution to coverage.

Three distinct objects: the evidence validation (admissibility), its contribution to the coverage of SO-001, and the human decision (section 06, DEC-001). Admissible evidence may still not cover the point under examination.

EV-001 Admissible

Secure Development Lifecycle Policy (SDLC)

Nature Internal policy document

Evidence validation (admissibility)

Policy SDLC-POL-03 (v2.4) was provided. It describes secure-by-design principles and security requirements management within the development lifecycle. Admissibility retained subject to verification of applicability to the embedded component.

Contribution to the coverage of SO-001
Partial coverage

Partial contribution: the policy establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented.

Assigned to
Internal auditor (fictitious)
Date

Evidence limit : The policy covers general software development; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented.

EV-002 Admissibility to be confirmed

Security Test Report (firmware pentest)

Nature Technical report

Evidence validation (admissibility)

Report PT-2026-07 was provided. It covers penetration testing on the network interface. Its own admissibility is not established in the narrative.

Contribution to the coverage of SO-001
Not covered

Point "post-update regression testing": the report does not cover regression testing on the target embedded component after a firmware update.

Assigned to
Internal auditor (fictitious)
Date

Evidence limit : Identified gap: absence of post-update regression testing on the NEXO-FW v2.1 embedded firmware.

05 — Sub-Obligation Coverage

Coverage of SO-001

Identifier COV-001

Partial coverage Partial coverage

The SDLC policy (EV-001) establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software. Security-by-design principles are formalized.

Post-update regression testing on the embedded firmware (the CRA-targeted component) is not documented. Evidence EV-002 does not cover this specific point.

Expected action: Provide a post-update regression test report explicitly covering NEXO-FW v2.1, or a formally equivalent procedure.

06 — Final Human Decision

Decision on SO-001

Additional evidence required — coverage suspended

The SDLC policy is admissible but insufficient to fully cover the sub-obligation. The test report (EV-002) presents a documented gap on the target component. A COMPLETE coverage decision cannot be issued at this stage.

Identifier
DEC-001
Decision-maker
Senior compliance auditor (fictitious)
Date

Linked objects

  • SRC-001
  • SO-001
  • AD-001
  • EV-001
  • EV-002
  • COV-001
  • RP-001
07 — Rejected Proposal

Rejected Assistance Proposal

The assistant proposed qualifying coverage as COMPLETE, relying on the SDLC policy (EV-001) as sufficient standalone evidence, without requiring a specific firmware test report.

— Assistance proposal (document analysis tool — outside the authority chain)

Status Rejected

Rejection motive

Rejected for insufficient evidence scope: the SDLC policy covers general development practices but does not constitute a demonstration that cybersecurity requirements were applied to the specific target embedded component (NEXO-FW v2.1) in its last update. The sub-obligation requires product-level verification, not just a general policy. Linkage to the source passage Art. 13(1) was not demonstrated for this specific component.

Identifier
RP-001
Rejected by
Senior compliance auditor (fictitious)
Date
Data Structure

Illustrative JSON Structure

Below is an illustrative example of the Scutaria data structure for this fictitious scenario. This JSON is not a production export. It contains no real, personal, or confidential data. The official references (CELEX, ELI) are real; the scenario is fictitious.

View the illustrative JSON structure

JSON Structure — illustrative example only

{
  "_note": "ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE ONLY — fictitious data, no legal value, not a production export",
  "scenario": {
    "id": "CRA-DEMO-001",
    "fictitious": true,
    "nature": "Fictitious methodological scenario (people, product, evidence and decisions); real regulatory sources"
  },
  "source": {
    "id": "SRC-001",
    "realSource": true,
    "regulation": "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 — Cyber Resilience Act",
    "article": "Art. 13(1)",
    "celex": "32024R2847",
    "eli": "http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj",
    "adoptionDate": "2024-10-23",
    "ojPublication": {
      "series": "L",
      "date": "2024-11-20"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "textType": "methodologicalParaphrase",
    "passage": "When placing a product with digital elements on the market, manufacturers ensure that the product has been designed, developed and manufactured in accordance with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I, Part I.",
    "provenanceHash": "No real document fingerprint is exposed in this demonstration."
  },
  "subObligation": {
    "id": "SO-001",
    "sourceRef": "SRC-001",
    "workStatus": "Working draft — validation in progress",
    "mappingNote": "Working mappings with documented rationale; their individual validation remains to be established."
  },
  "applicabilityDecision": {
    "id": "AD-001",
    "subObligationRef": "SO-001",
    "answer": "Applicable — under the hypothesis of inclusion within CRA scope",
    "status": "APPLICABLE",
    "assignedTo": "Product Compliance Manager (fictitious)",
    "date": "2026-09-12",
    "decisionStatus": "Decision attributed, dated, and recorded — declarative"
  },
  "evidences": [
    {
      "id": "EV-001",
      "label": "Secure Development Lifecycle Policy (SDLC)",
      "validation": {
        "status": "ADMISSIBLE",
        "label": "Admissible",
        "note": "Policy SDLC-POL-03 (v2.4) was provided. It describes secure-by-design principles and security requirements management within the development lifecycle. Admissibility retained subject to verification of applicability to the embedded component."
      },
      "limits": "The policy covers general software development; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented.",
      "coverageContribution": {
        "subObligationRef": "SO-001",
        "level": "PARTIAL",
        "note": "Partial contribution: the policy establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented."
      },
      "assignedTo": "Internal auditor (fictitious)",
      "date": "2026-09-14"
    },
    {
      "id": "EV-002",
      "label": "Security Test Report (firmware pentest)",
      "validation": {
        "status": "TO_CONFIRM",
        "label": "Admissibility to be confirmed",
        "note": "Report PT-2026-07 was provided. It covers penetration testing on the network interface. Its own admissibility is not established in the narrative."
      },
      "limits": "Identified gap: absence of post-update regression testing on the NEXO-FW v2.1 embedded firmware.",
      "coverageContribution": {
        "subObligationRef": "SO-001",
        "level": "NOT_COVERED",
        "note": "Point \"post-update regression testing\": the report does not cover regression testing on the target embedded component after a firmware update."
      },
      "assignedTo": "Internal auditor (fictitious)",
      "date": "2026-09-15"
    }
  ],
  "coverage": {
    "id": "COV-001",
    "subObligationRef": "SO-001",
    "evidenceRefs": [
      "EV-001",
      "EV-002"
    ],
    "level": "PARTIAL",
    "covered": "The SDLC policy (EV-001) establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software. Security-by-design principles are formalized.",
    "missing": "Post-update regression testing on the embedded firmware (the CRA-targeted component) is not documented. Evidence EV-002 does not cover this specific point."
  },
  "humanDecision": {
    "id": "DEC-001",
    "decision": "Additional evidence required — coverage suspended",
    "assignedTo": "Senior compliance auditor (fictitious)",
    "date": "2026-09-18",
    "linkedObjects": [
      "SRC-001",
      "SO-001",
      "AD-001",
      "EV-001",
      "EV-002",
      "COV-001",
      "RP-001"
    ]
  },
  "rejectedProposal": {
    "id": "RP-001",
    "status": "REJECTED",
    "proposal": "The assistant proposed qualifying coverage as COMPLETE, relying on the SDLC policy (EV-001) as sufficient standalone evidence, without requiring a specific firmware test report.",
    "origin": "Assistance proposal (document analysis tool — outside the authority chain)",
    "rejectionMotive": "Rejected for insufficient evidence scope: the SDLC policy covers general development practices but does not constitute a demonstration that cybersecurity requirements were applied to the specific target embedded component (NEXO-FW v2.1) in its last update. The sub-obligation requires product-level verification, not just a general policy. Linkage to the source passage Art. 13(1) was not demonstrated for this specific component.",
    "rejectedBy": "Senior compliance auditor (fictitious)",
    "date": "2026-09-17"
  }
}