From the CRA source to the human decision
A fictitious case illustrating the complete chain: official text → sub-obligation → applicability → evidence → coverage → human decision — including a rejected proposal.
Mandatory Methodological Notice
- The scenario below is entirely fictitious. The entities, products, evidence, and decisions presented do not exist.
- This content illustrates a regulatory traceability method. It does not constitute legal advice.
- It does not demonstrate the CRA compliance of any product, organization, or client.
- Any real regulatory decision remains human, contextualized, and the responsibility of a qualified professional.
- Regulatory references (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) are real; their interpretation in this scenario is methodological and non-exhaustive.
The traceability chain for this case
Every link is documented, attributed, and examinable. The rejected proposal remains visible.
- Official source
- Sub-obligation
- Applicability decision
- Evidence and validation
- Coverage
- Human decision
- Rejected proposal
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 — Cyber Resilience Act
Methodological paraphrase — English rendering of the French text of Art. 13(1), not the official English wording
When placing a product with digital elements on the market, manufacturers ensure that the product has been designed, developed and manufactured in accordance with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I, Part I.
Internal ID SRC-001
This demonstration aims for alignment with ELI; it does not claim systematic ELI implementation.
SO-001: Integration of cybersecurity requirements into the development lifecycle
Working interpretation
For a fictitious embedded software product hypothetically within CRA scope, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the essential cybersecurity requirements (Annex I, Part I) have been integrated into its development process — secure-by-design, vulnerability management, security testing.
Status Working draft — validation in progress
This formulation is a methodological interpretation for demonstration purposes. It does not constitute an automatic legal equivalence or expert legal advice.
Does this sub-obligation apply to the fictitious product?
Does the fictitious product "NEXO-FW v2.1" (embedded firmware for industrial IoT device) fall within the scope of CRA Art. 13(1)?
NEXO-FW v2.1 is an embedded software made available on the Union market, integrated into a device with digital elements. Under the fictitious assumption that this product falls within CRA scope, Art. 13(1) applies without identified exception.
The decision is presented as attributed and dated. It is not equivalent to an electronic signature or an automated legal decision.
Fictitious Evidence Examined
Each piece of evidence is evaluated for its own admissibility, distinctly from its contribution to coverage.
Three distinct objects: the evidence validation (admissibility), its contribution to the coverage of SO-001, and the human decision (section 06, DEC-001). Admissible evidence may still not cover the point under examination.
EV-001 Admissible Secure Development Lifecycle Policy (SDLC)
Nature Internal policy document
Policy SDLC-POL-03 (v2.4) was provided. It describes secure-by-design principles and security requirements management within the development lifecycle. Admissibility retained subject to verification of applicability to the embedded component.
Partial contribution: the policy establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented.
Evidence limit : The policy covers general software development; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented.
EV-002 Admissibility to be confirmed Security Test Report (firmware pentest)
Nature Technical report
Report PT-2026-07 was provided. It covers penetration testing on the network interface. Its own admissibility is not established in the narrative.
Point "post-update regression testing": the report does not cover regression testing on the target embedded component after a firmware update.
Evidence limit : Identified gap: absence of post-update regression testing on the NEXO-FW v2.1 embedded firmware.
Coverage of SO-001
Identifier COV-001
The SDLC policy (EV-001) establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software. Security-by-design principles are formalized.
Post-update regression testing on the embedded firmware (the CRA-targeted component) is not documented. Evidence EV-002 does not cover this specific point.
Expected action: Provide a post-update regression test report explicitly covering NEXO-FW v2.1, or a formally equivalent procedure.
Decision on SO-001
Additional evidence required — coverage suspended
The SDLC policy is admissible but insufficient to fully cover the sub-obligation. The test report (EV-002) presents a documented gap on the target component. A COMPLETE coverage decision cannot be issued at this stage.
Linked objects
SRC-001SO-001AD-001EV-001EV-002COV-001RP-001
Rejected Assistance Proposal
The assistant proposed qualifying coverage as COMPLETE, relying on the SDLC policy (EV-001) as sufficient standalone evidence, without requiring a specific firmware test report.
Status Rejected
Rejection motive
Rejected for insufficient evidence scope: the SDLC policy covers general development practices but does not constitute a demonstration that cybersecurity requirements were applied to the specific target embedded component (NEXO-FW v2.1) in its last update. The sub-obligation requires product-level verification, not just a general policy. Linkage to the source passage Art. 13(1) was not demonstrated for this specific component.
Illustrative JSON Structure
Below is an illustrative example of the Scutaria data structure for this fictitious scenario. This JSON is not a production export. It contains no real, personal, or confidential data. The official references (CELEX, ELI) are real; the scenario is fictitious.
View the illustrative JSON structure
JSON Structure — illustrative example only
{
"_note": "ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE ONLY — fictitious data, no legal value, not a production export",
"scenario": {
"id": "CRA-DEMO-001",
"fictitious": true,
"nature": "Fictitious methodological scenario (people, product, evidence and decisions); real regulatory sources"
},
"source": {
"id": "SRC-001",
"realSource": true,
"regulation": "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 — Cyber Resilience Act",
"article": "Art. 13(1)",
"celex": "32024R2847",
"eli": "http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj",
"adoptionDate": "2024-10-23",
"ojPublication": {
"series": "L",
"date": "2024-11-20"
},
"language": "en",
"textType": "methodologicalParaphrase",
"passage": "When placing a product with digital elements on the market, manufacturers ensure that the product has been designed, developed and manufactured in accordance with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I, Part I.",
"provenanceHash": "No real document fingerprint is exposed in this demonstration."
},
"subObligation": {
"id": "SO-001",
"sourceRef": "SRC-001",
"workStatus": "Working draft — validation in progress",
"mappingNote": "Working mappings with documented rationale; their individual validation remains to be established."
},
"applicabilityDecision": {
"id": "AD-001",
"subObligationRef": "SO-001",
"answer": "Applicable — under the hypothesis of inclusion within CRA scope",
"status": "APPLICABLE",
"assignedTo": "Product Compliance Manager (fictitious)",
"date": "2026-09-12",
"decisionStatus": "Decision attributed, dated, and recorded — declarative"
},
"evidences": [
{
"id": "EV-001",
"label": "Secure Development Lifecycle Policy (SDLC)",
"validation": {
"status": "ADMISSIBLE",
"label": "Admissible",
"note": "Policy SDLC-POL-03 (v2.4) was provided. It describes secure-by-design principles and security requirements management within the development lifecycle. Admissibility retained subject to verification of applicability to the embedded component."
},
"limits": "The policy covers general software development; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented.",
"coverageContribution": {
"subObligationRef": "SO-001",
"level": "PARTIAL",
"note": "Partial contribution: the policy establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software; its explicit applicability to embedded firmware is not formally documented."
},
"assignedTo": "Internal auditor (fictitious)",
"date": "2026-09-14"
},
{
"id": "EV-002",
"label": "Security Test Report (firmware pentest)",
"validation": {
"status": "TO_CONFIRM",
"label": "Admissibility to be confirmed",
"note": "Report PT-2026-07 was provided. It covers penetration testing on the network interface. Its own admissibility is not established in the narrative."
},
"limits": "Identified gap: absence of post-update regression testing on the NEXO-FW v2.1 embedded firmware.",
"coverageContribution": {
"subObligationRef": "SO-001",
"level": "NOT_COVERED",
"note": "Point \"post-update regression testing\": the report does not cover regression testing on the target embedded component after a firmware update."
},
"assignedTo": "Internal auditor (fictitious)",
"date": "2026-09-15"
}
],
"coverage": {
"id": "COV-001",
"subObligationRef": "SO-001",
"evidenceRefs": [
"EV-001",
"EV-002"
],
"level": "PARTIAL",
"covered": "The SDLC policy (EV-001) establishes a documented secure development framework applicable to software. Security-by-design principles are formalized.",
"missing": "Post-update regression testing on the embedded firmware (the CRA-targeted component) is not documented. Evidence EV-002 does not cover this specific point."
},
"humanDecision": {
"id": "DEC-001",
"decision": "Additional evidence required — coverage suspended",
"assignedTo": "Senior compliance auditor (fictitious)",
"date": "2026-09-18",
"linkedObjects": [
"SRC-001",
"SO-001",
"AD-001",
"EV-001",
"EV-002",
"COV-001",
"RP-001"
]
},
"rejectedProposal": {
"id": "RP-001",
"status": "REJECTED",
"proposal": "The assistant proposed qualifying coverage as COMPLETE, relying on the SDLC policy (EV-001) as sufficient standalone evidence, without requiring a specific firmware test report.",
"origin": "Assistance proposal (document analysis tool — outside the authority chain)",
"rejectionMotive": "Rejected for insufficient evidence scope: the SDLC policy covers general development practices but does not constitute a demonstration that cybersecurity requirements were applied to the specific target embedded component (NEXO-FW v2.1) in its last update. The sub-obligation requires product-level verification, not just a general policy. Linkage to the source passage Art. 13(1) was not demonstrated for this specific component.",
"rejectedBy": "Senior compliance auditor (fictitious)",
"date": "2026-09-17"
}
}